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International Legal Updates
North America
A Case for Responsible Development
of the Alberta Oil Sands
In July 2009, in the remote community
of Beaver Lake, Alberta, journalists from
the BBC beheld an unusual sight: two
British bankers taking part in a traditional
Cree ceremony. From their business dress
and stiff dancing, the bankers looked out
of place, but it was not their familiarity or
fascination with Cree culture that brought
them there. They represented the UK-based
Co-operative Bank, known for its aim to
practice ethical investing, which had just
agreed to financially assist the Cree with
their legal challenge. The Beaver Lake Cree
claim that after 130 years, rights they were
guaranteed by treaty are being ignored by
the governments of Alberta and Canada in
order to allow for oil development.
Within the traditional hunting grounds
of the Cree lies what some argue is the
single largest oil deposit on the planet. By
recoverable volume, the Alberta Oil Sands
deposit is second only to the oil fields of
Saudi Arabia. However, unlike the freeflowing Saudi oil, the process of removing
the tar-like bitumen from the sandy soil
is energy intensive and, in some cases,
extremely invasive. Mining companies
remove the oil through on site steam injection or strip-mining, both of which carry
significant environmental consequences.
Currently, most of the oil sand is recovered via strip-mining, where the oil must
be washed from the sand with hot water,
resulting in significant tailings effluent that
is disposed of in massive tailings ponds.
These ponds are often situated adjacent to
natural bodies of water. Squeezing oil from
sand has required drilling, mining, habitat
removal, and creation of some twenty
square miles of tailings ponds, dramatically changing the habitat of the Beaver
Lake Cree’s traditional hunting grounds
and threatening the Cree’s way of life.
With help from the Co-operative Bank
and others, the Beaver Lake Cree hope
to stop the rapid expansion of the oil
sands mining operations. Their complaint
cites Treaty Six, signed in 1876 with the

Canadian government, and pits rights guaranteed by a 130-year-old treaty against
the economic potential of an estimated
three million barrels of oil per day. In the
treaty, the Beaver Lake Cree and many
other native peoples in Alberta and Saskatchewan agreed to “cede, release, surrender and yield up to the Dominion of
Canada . . . all their rights, titles and
privileges” to their lands. In exchange, the
Government agreed to protect their “right
to pursue their avocations of hunting and
fishing throughout the tract surrendered.”
However, little scientific testing has been
done to quantify the destruction that the
Beaver Lake Cree observe around them
and measure its impact on their “right to
pursue their avocations.”
Fortunately for the Beaver Lake Cree,
a recent case decided in British Columbia
argued by their attorney Jack Woodward,
suggests that courts still recognize and
uphold such treaty rights. In Tsilhqot’in
First Nation v. British Columbia, the court
held that the Tsilhqot’in rights to hunt,
trap, and trade on over 400,000 hectares
of their territory had been violated. A
similar success for the Beaver Lake Cree
would help set a precedent in Canada that
development of natural resources should
not come at the expense of indigenous and
human rights.

The Failed Execution of Romell
Broom: An “Innocent Misadventure”
in Due Process?
For the third time in three years, Ohio’s
execution team spent well over an hour
trying to locate a suitable vein on an
inmate through which to administer a lethal
injection. Yet, Romell Broom’s attempted
execution on September 15, 2009 is the
first time Ohio has ever had to halt and
reschedule an execution because the team
could not establish an intravenous drip. The
Governor’s warrant of reprieve postponing
the execution said, “Difficulties in administering the execution protocol necessitate
a temporary reprieve . . . .” The media
drew attention to the pain Broom likely
felt being poked 18 times with a needle,
sometimes penetrating to the bone, and the
frustration of his family, forced to watch
39

the grueling and ultimately unsuccessful
process. Some have even focused on the
pattern of “difficulties” that has emerged
in lethal injections in Ohio, contending that
they constitute more than a mere “innocent
misadventure,” as described by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, which held
that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but noted that repeated abortive
attempts at an execution might. The ineptitude revealed by Broom’s failed execution
is magnified by the failure of due process
to prevent such a situation. Only two weeks
before his scheduled execution, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Broom’s
claims that just such a failure might occur.
After nearly 25 years on Ohio’s death
row, Broom’s appeals and clemency efforts
failed completely in 2007. He then intervened in Cooey v. Strickland, challenging
the constitutionality of lethal injection as
administered in Ohio. The Sixth Circuit
held on September 1, 2009 that there
could be no recourse for Broom against
Ohio’s execution protocol, even if it violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment, because
his claims violated the statute of limitations. It was not relevant to the court that
Broom was still involved in post-conviction appeals at the time he should have
begun litigation challenging the method of
his execution to satisfy the statute. Requiring death row inmates to pursue multiple
paths of litigation simultaneously places a
heavy burden on attorneys and their clients
and challenges traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. The injustice
of these decisions is only heightened by the
proximity of Broom’s failed execution to
the extinguishment of his claims.
Had Broom’s claims succeeded under
the statute of limitations, they still would
have been held to the extremely high
standard set forth in Baze, requiring that
plaintiffs adequately prove an alternative
execution method that is “feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly
reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.”
Such a high standard paired with limited
means prevents death row inmates like
Broom from effectively challenging the
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execution method to be used on them,
even in well-founded cases. Broom’s failed
execution exemplifies not only the cruel
and unusual nature of lethal injection,
but also of the high barriers courts have
erected against challenges to that method.
The inability of inmates like Broom to
overcome the heightened barriers created
by cases like Baze and Cooey shows that
what failed in Ohio was not just an execution protocol, but due process.

Immigration Detention Centers:
America’s Other Healthcare Crisis
I am 35-year-old man without a
penis with my life on the line. I have
a young daughter, Vanessa, who is
only 14. She is here with me today
because she wanted to support me
— and because I wanted her to
see her father do something for the
greater good, so that she will have
that memory of me. The thought that
her pain — and mine — could have
been avoided almost makes this too
much to bear.
Francisco Castaneda spoke these words
on October 4, 2007 before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security, and International Law during a hearing titled “Detention and Removal: Immigration Detainee
Medical Care.” Mr. Castaneda died five
months later from metastasized squamous
cell carcinoma of the penis. His family maintains the civil case he brought
against the Government for its failure to
provide adequate medical care while he
was detained at an immigration detention center in California. The case is now
before the U.S. Supreme Court, stalled
on the issue of whether Mr. Castaneda’s
family has standing to sue the individuals
responsible for deciding that the medical
procedures that could have saved his life
were “elective” and therefore not available
to detainees.
With over 300,000 people moving
through the U.S. immigrant detention system each year, problems of access to adequate medical care affect large numbers of
people. The federal government provides
medical care at 23 immigration detention
facilities, which house nearly half of the
33,000 immigrants detained on any given
day. The average duration of detention is
38 days, but some immigrants wait months
or even years for their day in court. During that time, detainees are only allowed

medical care approved by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the agency in
charge of the detention centers. ICE’s current policy is to hold detainees who are fit
for deportation, allowing non-emergency
off-site doctors visits only if necessary
to prevent a change in deportation status.
Fortunately, that policy is set to change in
2010 to provide detainees more access to
non-emergency medical attention.
These changes came too late for Mr.
Castaneda. There is also concern that they
will not help many detainees who need it
most. The regulations set forth by ICE’s
parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security, are not binding on ICE or
its employees. They have the legal weight
of suggestion, and since only one in ten
detainees has a lawyer, it is likely that
few would be equipped to pursue a legal
remedy.
Federal employees are considered by the
majority of U.S. federal circuits to be protected from suit by the Federal Tort Claims
Act. If successful, Mr. Castaneda’s civil
suit has the potential to provide a remedy
to those who have access to counsel by
allowing claims against ICE employees in
their individual capacity. Mr. Castaneda’s
Bivens claim, an action outside the scope
of the Federal Tort Claim Act, against the
doctors who treated him and the officials
who denied him care may scare the agency
or Congress into action, providing some
avenue of relief for detainees seeking justice. Still, a more reasonable solution is to
create a binding set of rules to ensure that
immigrants detained in the United States
are not denied basic medical care.

Latin America
Guatemalan Court Sentences
Military Official for 1980s Forced
Disappearances
For the first time in Guatemalan history,
a former military official was found guilty
of ordering the forced disappearances of
indigenous civilian farmers during the violent 36-year civil war. On August 31, 2009,
a panel of three judges sentenced Felipe
Cusanero Coj to 150 years in prison: 25
years for each of the six disappeared farmers. In Guatemala, cases for forced disappearances can be brought anytime until
the remains of the missing are found. The
bodies of the six farmers, each abducted
between 1982 and 1984, have not been
40

recovered and their families initiated proceedings against Cusanero in 2003.
The Guatemalan conflict between leftist guerrillas and government forces raged
from 1960 to 1996, ending when the two
sides signed the 1996 Peace Accords. During this time about 250,000 people, primarily indigenous Mayans, were killed and
about 45,000 were forcibly disappeared.
Forced disappearance, a powerful tool used
by the government during the conflict, is
defined as the detention or abduction of
a person by a government or group acting
with the government’s authority, coupled
with the concealment of the fate of the
person. As with many of the disappeared,
it is unclear why these six farmers were
targeted or what happened to them.
During the conflict, the government
created “civil defense patrols,” made up
of groups of citizens who were forced
or recruited to patrol their communities.
There is some disagreement as to whether
Cusanero is considered a former paramilitary official or military official. Since
the Guatemalan government is trying to
avoid responsibility for the actions of the
civil defense patrols during the conflict,
it considers the individuals who were part
of these patrols to be paramilitary. During
the conflict, government forces detained,
killed, and disappeared people, frequently
ordering these patrols to do the same.
Cusanero, who was the mayor of his community at the time, was in charge of the
patrol located west of Guatemala City and
ordered the forced disappearances of community members. Since he was in charge
of military operations in the area, he most
likely ordered the forced disappearances of
additional civilians, but other community
members have remained silent for fear of
retaliation.
Such fear has several likely roots. Indigenous communities are still wary of the
Guatemalan government because of past
government-led oppression. In addition,
some former military leaders still work
for the government and wield significant
power. Furthermore, since the civil defense
patrols pitted community members against
one another, people who were part of these
patrols and those who were targeted often
still live in close proximity. Survivors of
the conflict are often hesitant to institute
proceedings because they would have to
continue living in the same community as
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the individuals they would be accusing of
committing heinous crimes.
Although the Cusanero decision sets a
significant precedent in accountability for
forced disappearances, Cusanero played a
very small part in the larger scheme of the
civil war. The masterminds of the conflict
have yet to be held responsible for their
actions.
Nevertheless, the Cusanero case is
a welcome exception to past trends in
the Guatemalan justice system regarding
human rights violations committed during
the conflict. Cases of this nature have often
floundered, as both the parties bringing the
action and the judges frequently receive
threats, usually from the accused. Hopefully this change in direction will mark
a new beginning of accountability in the
Guatemalan justice system, while providing closure for families of the victims of
the disappeared.

Indigenous Ecuadorians Clash with
Police over Proposed Water Law
Hundreds of indigenous peoples from
the Ecuadorian Amazon protested the proposal of a new national water law on
September 30, 2009. The protest was organized by the Confederation of Indigenous
Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), a
group working to protect natural resources.
Held near the southern city of Macas,
the protest ended in violence as police
killed one indigenous man and injured
dozens more. Approximately forty police
officers were also injured. The violence
was halted when police pulled out of the
region on orders from Ecuador’s president,
Rafael Correa. Following the conflict, Correa invited indigenous leaders to the capital
to discuss their concerns regarding the
proposed law. Although CONAIE has yet
to meet its primary objective of complete
authority over indigenous communities’
ancestral lands and resources, it appears to
be making progress through dialogue with
government officials.
The indigenous communities are surrounded by wetlands, which provide the
water they need for subsistence farming
and drinking. However, new commercial
mining projects are being developed in this
fragile environment. The new water law
would prioritize private mining companies’
use of water for their operations, effectively privatizing water resources. Mines
typically use large amounts of water in

order to extract metals from the rock.
Indigenous communities are concerned
that if the state grants these private companies unlimited access, there will not
be enough water to adequately fulfill the
needs of the communities.
This proposed law may be in direct
conflict with Ecuador’s newly passed
constitution, which articulates the rights
of indigenous communities to maintain
possession of their communal lands and
ancestral territories, including participation in the use of natural resources. The
Constitution explicitly provides the rights
to water and nourishment, as well as the
right of the pacha mama (mother earth) to
be respected, maintained, and regenerated.
Roughly translated, Article 15 stipulates
that the sovereignty of energy will not take
priority over the right to water. Therefore,
the use of water by private companies
should not take precedence over the water
needs of local communities.
While the President has agreed to cooperate with indigenous communities, he
must balance these concerns with national
interests, such as generation of income
from mining operations. The Congress has
suspended further discussions on the law
until further notice.
This kind of conflict is not unique
to Ecuador and seems to be a recurring
problem throughout Latin America. For
example, in June 2009, Peruvian police
killed dozens of Amazonian indigenous
peoples who were protesting new government policies allowing foreign companies
to exploit natural resources in the communities’ ancestral lands.
The noticeable similarity between these
conflicts is that the interests of indigenous
communities do not appear to be a government priority. These communities rely on
natural resources and communal living
to survive, and their homelands are being
destroyed by natural resource extraction
projects with increasing frequency. Given
this reality, it is essential for indigenous
groups to continue to organize against
encroachment on their land, culture, and
way of life.

Controversy over Nicaraguan
Supreme Court Ruling Allowing
President Ortega to Seek
Re-Election in 2011
On October 19, 2009, left-wing Sandinista justices on the Constitutional Com41

mission of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court
ruled that Sandinista President Daniel
Ortega will be eligible to run for re-election
in 2011. The decision effectively overturns
portions of Article 147 of the Nicaraguan
Constitution, which set a presidential term
limit of no more than two inconsecutive
terms. The decision is said to be final, but
the right-wing Liberal party justices argue
that it is illegal.
This decision presents two issues. First,
because Latin America is plagued with a
history of dictatorships, preserving presidential term limits in this region is of
the utmost importance. The international
community has expressed concern over
the number of Latin American presidents
who have been attempting to amend presidential term limits. For example, President
Hugo Chávez of Venezuela won a popular
referendum in February of this year that
eliminates term limits.
Nicaragua’s Constitution has included
presidential term limits since 1995. The
National Assembly can amend constitutional provisions by a two-thirds majority
vote. The Supreme Court cannot amend the
Constitution, but can rule part of it “inapplicable,” as it did in its most recent decision on term limits. After an unsuccessful
attempt to get the National Assembly to lift
the limits, President Ortega filed a “motion
of unconstitutionality,” which was referred
to the Supreme Court for a ruling.
The second issue raised by this decision
is the Supreme Court’s lack of transparency while reaching the decision. During
the ruling, only Sandinista justices were
present even though Liberal party justices
also sit on the Constitutional Committee.
Liberal party justices claim they were not
called in time to participate in the decision
and that they did not know the decision
was even being made at that time. The
Supreme Court as a whole has yet to vote
on the issue. The U.S. State Department
commented that “the ruling appears to
short circuit, through legal maneuverings,
the open and transparent consideration by
the Nicaraguan people of the possibility for
presidential re-election.”
Nations across Latin America struggle
with upholding constitutional limits on
presidential terms. Proponents of the softening of presidential term limits argue that
allowing for two or more consecutive terms
may provide more time for presidents
to accomplish their goals and capitalize
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on campaign promises. Furthermore, if
presidents are vying for re-election, they
may have additional incentive to appease
their citizens to gain voter support. While
these arguments are well founded, Latin
America has a special interest in closely
monitoring this trend to ensure that history is not repeated. If the softening of
presidential term limits is indeed found to
be beneficial, the process of doing so must
be transparent if the countries concerned
wish to maintain democracies. In the case
of Nicaragua, Ortega should ensure that
the process is consistent with democratic
principles.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire: Settlement but no
Liability in Toxic Waste Dumping
Case
In August 2006, hundreds of thousands
of people in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, discovered that noxious toxic waste had been
dumped in 15 public locations around the
city, forcing thousands to flee their homes
and businesses. Following the dumping,
as many as 17 deaths were linked to toxic
waste exposure, and over 100,000 people
visited health clinics. The public outcry
against the incident was so overwhelming
that Côte d’Ivoire’s interim government
was forced to resign.
Trafigura, a Dutch-based crude oil company, acknowledges hiring a contractor to
dump the waste in Côte d’Ivoire, but denies
any wrongdoing. Evidence suggests, however, that the company was aware of the
environmental and public health dangers
and the likelihood of inadequate waste
disposal in Côte d’Ivoire. After failing
to legally unload the waste elsewhere,
Trafigura transported it to Abidjan on
August 19, 2006 and hired a local contractor. The contractor, Tommy Ltd., had been
established only weeks before and had no
prior experience handling caustic waste.
Although Tommy Ltd. assured Trafigura
that it would dump the waste in proper
facilities in Akouédo, an area outside of
Abidjan, minimal research would have
revealed that the town had no caustic waste
facilities. Trafigura paid Tommy Ltd. U.S.
$20,000 for its services — services which,
if done properly elsewhere, would have
cost 16 times that price.
For the past three years, various legal
battles have ensued to determine liability

and to punish those responsible. Three
company officers, including Trafigura boss
Claude Dauphin, spent six months in an
Abidjan jail following the incident. They
were released shortly after an out-of-court
settlement with the Ivoirian government.
In 2008, Salomon Ugborugbo, the owner
of Tommy Ltd., was convicted for poisoning and sentenced to twenty years in
prison. Seven other Ivoirian officials were
acquitted, and the State decided evidence
was insufficient for criminal proceedings
against Trafigura officials.
In February 2007, without consulting victims’ associations, Côte d’Ivoire’s
government accepted a U.S. $198 million settlement from Trafigura for cleanup
and victim compensation, and waived any
future State liability actions. However,
many human rights groups assert that victims have had difficulty registering claims
or receiving compensation proportionate to
their medical and other related expenses.
On September 17, 2009, the victims’
lawyers from the British firm Leigh Day &
Co. also settled with Trafigura. The agreement allowed 31,000 victims to collect
U.S. $1,546 each, approximately six times
less than originally sought. The settlement
stated that the victims accepted that the
waste was not clearly linked to any deaths
or serious injuries, and that Trafigura was
not responsible for Tommy Ltd.’s illegal
dumping.
In October 2009, a confidential scientific report conducted by Trafigura was
leaked to the public. It links thousands of
illnesses to the dumping and acknowledges
that, one month after the dumping, Trafigura was aware that the lethal substances
could cause deaths, severe burns, and other
side effects. Trafigura failed to release the
report or any of this information to the
31,000 victims involved in the settlement.
While no further legal action can be
brought against Trafigura in Côte d’Ivoire,
a 20,000 person class-action suit is pending in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile,
the Dutch government has chosen not to
pursue any legal action against Claude
Dauphin.
Although cleanup efforts in Abidjan
began in September 2006, some sites
remain contaminated. The United Nations
reports that a French company has successfully decontaminated eight dump sites, but
others remain unsafe. Prior to and since the
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Côte d’Ivoire incident, Trafigura has been
linked with numerous questionable business dealings.

International Community Must
Respond Forcefully to Guinea
Massacre
The September 28, 2009, daylight massacre of 150 peaceful demonstrators by
Guinean security forces sparked international outrage and condemnation. Unfortunately, violence by Guinean security forces
is not unprecedented. In 2007, security
forces suppressed public demonstrations
by killing over 130 people and injuring more than 1,500 people. In response,
the then transition government of former
military president Lansana Conté created
an Independent National Commission
of Inquiry that documented up to 3,156
human rights violations. However, no one
was arrested and victims have not received
promised compensation.
Despite pressure on former president
Conté after the 2007 killings, Guinea
never returned to civilian rule. Hours after
Conté’s death in December 2008, Moussa
Dadis Camara led a military coup and suspended the Constitution. In response, the
African Union suspended Guinea’s membership, but Nigeria, Senegal, and France
supported Camara. In an attempt to ensure
a timely and transparent transition to civilian government, regional groups formed
the International Contact Group on Guinea
in February 2009.
Weeks before the most recent massacre,
however, Camara indicated that he would
run in the January 2010 election. Civilians mounted a protest in Conakry, which
ended when Guinea security forces opened
fire and killed an estimated 150 people,
injured 1,253, and publically raped at least
33 women.
To prevent future atrocities, the international community must respond more
forcefully than it has in the past. So far,
the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) has appointed Burkina
Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré, to
mediate between Camara’s party and the
political opposition. On October 14, 2009,
the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor confirmed that he is investigating possible war crimes committed by Guinea’s
security forces. On October 30, 2009,
the United Nations announced that three
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prominent jurists will form an independent
commission to inquire into the events.
While these actions are encouraging,
the situation in Guinea remains unstable.
On October 28, 2009, approximately thirty
youths led a five-day hunger strike to protest further violence and encourage political dialogue. Domestic and international
investigations must produce results and
lead to prosecutions of the responsible parties. Above all, Guinea must be pressured
to return to a civilian government and
restore the rule of law.

Zambia to Decide Constitutionality
of Mandatory HIV Testing
For the first time, a Zambian court is
considering whether it is constitutional to
exclude HIV-positive personnel from the
military. Sergeants Stainley Kingaipe and
Charles Chookole allege that the Zambian
Air Force (ZAF) subjected them to HIV
testing without consent or counseling, in
violation of their rights to privacy, freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, and freedom from discrimination, pursuant to Articles 11, 15, and 23
of the Zambian Constitution. Both are
represented by the Legal Resources Foundation of Zambia, with assistance from the
Southern Africa Litigation Centre and the
Zambian AIDS Law Research and Advocacy Network.
Kingaipe and Chookole served in the
ZAF for 13 years. In 2001, both went for
medical exams and, unlike in prior routine exams, they were given blood tests
and subsequently placed on anti-retroviral medication. They never received test
results and were not told the purpose of the
medication. A year later, the ZAF Medical
Board assessed both men unfit for service
and discharged them, even though neither
had taken any sick leave and Cookole had
in fact been promoted. The two men did
not find out they were HIV-positive until
both later went for voluntary HIV testing,
and were informed that they had already
been given anti-retrovirals.
Since 2003, the ZAF’s official policy
bans HIV-positive recruits, but does not
allow the military to discharge HIV-positive people who are already employed. The
ZAF claims that the men were dismissed
because Kingaipe has cancer and Chookole has tuberculosis; however this does
not explain why neither was informed they
were HIV-positive.

The current litigation reflects a larger
debate among governments, NGOs, and
human rights groups over how to implement policies designed to curb the spread
of HIV while protecting the rights of
infected people. In 2008, the Pretoria High
Court in South Africa declared that military bans on HIV-positive recruits and
employees were unconstitutional, despite
the military’s claim that they posed a risk to
other soldiers, were not suited for stressful
conditions, and undermined the military’s
duty to protect the nation. On the other
hand, in Botswana, employers in all professions can legally test and deny employment
to HIV-positive applicants. The United
Nations allows HIV-positive people in its
peace-keeping forces, but permits continued service so long as they pass regular
“fitness for duty” health assessments.
Zambian Health Minister Kapembwa
Simbao has called for compulsory HIV
testing for everyone who visits a public
health facility, because voluntary counseling and testing procedures have not led to
widespread testing. Zambia has a 14 percent HIV infection rate — a number which
rises to 29 percent in the military — and
only 15 percent of the population has ever
been voluntarily tested.
Human rights groups assert that mandatory testing violates the right to privacy
and leads to discrimination. Compulsory
HIV testing may also cause people to avoid
going to health care centers and increase
stigma and discrimination. Policies that
limit freedom instead of protecting rights
lead to laws that are blatantly discriminatory. For example, in Togo it is illegal not to
use a condom, and in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger, women can be criminally charged for not taking precautions to
prevent transmitting HIV to their unborn
children. Currently, 15 HIV-positive Nambian women are suing the government for
forced sterilizations at public hospitals.
As nations struggle to prevent the spread
of HIV, they must also respect human rights
and refrain from discriminatory practices.
Zambia is bound by its Constitution, the
African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights, and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, all of which
require the government to protect individuals from inhuman and degrading treatment,
privacy, and discrimination. To adhere to
these obligations, the Zambian High Court
should order the ZAF to reinstate Kingaipe
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and Chookole and give HIV-positive members regular health assessments instead of
barring them from service.

Middle East and North Africa
Situation Worsens for Yemeni
Refugees
An estimated 150,000 civilians have
been displaced and left with little humanitarian aid in Northern Yemen as a result
of recent conflict. Fighting between the
Yemeni government and the Huthis, a
Shia rebel group based in the northern
province of Sa’ada, began in 2004 when
cleric leader Hussein al-Houthi launched
an uprising against the Government. The
Yemeni government recommenced military
action in July 2009 after a year-long ceasefire, and violence has escalated in recent
months. Aid organizations are declaring
conditions for civilians in Northern Yemen
a humanitarian crisis.
Thousands of civilians have fled their
homes to escape the fighting. However,
many have become stranded with no access
to food, medical attention, electricity, shelter, clean water, or protection. The area
has been inaccessible to outsiders for three
months, and food reserves are running
out.
The Yemeni army has blocked aid to
Sa’ada city, claiming that the current situation is too dangerous for aid workers to
enter. The International Red Cross and
Red Crescent have been able to assist individuals who managed to escape the conflict
area, but those stuck in the city have been
left with no humanitarian aid.
Aid organizations are hoping that the
Huthis rebel group and the Yemeni government will declare a temporary cease-fire
so that humanitarian groups can enter the
area, but this seems unlikely. A ceasefire
was briefly declared for Eid al-Fitr, but
both sides accused each other of violating
it.
Even those who are able to reach refugee camps are not necessarily safe. On
September 17, 2009, Yemeni air strikes hit
a refugee camp near the Sufian area, killing 87 civilians and injuring 40 others. The
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reports
that many of the casualties are women and
children.
Like all non-state armed groups, the
same humanitarian law principles to which
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Yemen is bound also bind the Huthi rebel
group. Both have an obligation under Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on
the Protection of Civilian Persons to allow
the civilian populations at risk access to
humanitarian aid. Further, Article 54 of
Additional Protocol I prohibits states and
non-state actors from leaving civilian populations with inadequate access to food and
water. As hundreds of civilians wait, displaced from their homes and exposed to the
violence of war, it is clear that neither side
is upholding its international obligations.
In its flash appeal on September 2, 2009
to stimulate funding for relief efforts in
Yemen, the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned
that the crisis could worsen in the following weeks and called on the international
community to step up relief effort. As of
November 10, OCHA had only collected
about 46 percent of the U.S. $23.7 million
for which it appealed.

As the Syrian Supreme State
Security Court Resumes Operation,
Arrests and Sentencing of Human
Rights Defenders Increase
On September 17, 2009, the European
Parliament passed a resolution demanding the release of Muhammad al-Hassni.
Hassni, the president of the Syrian Organization for Human Rights, is known for
monitoring the detention conditions and
legal practices of the Syrian Supreme State
Security Court (SSSC). The Syrian government arrested him on July 28, charging him
with “weakening national sentiment.”
Hassni’s arrest is part of a wave of
repression against human rights defenders
that began early this summer. As recently
as September, the Syrian Centre for Media
and Free Expression was closed without
warning, and blogger Kareem Arabji was
sentenced to three years in prison. This
trend seems particularly timely. After an
eight-month hiatus, the controversial SSSC
quietly restarted its operations, just two
months prior to Hassni’s arrest.
Human Rights Watch issued a report
last year calling on Syria to dissolve the
SSSC. The report accused the SSSC of
using illegal incarcerations to intimidate
political opposition. The SSSC practices
violate a number of international conventions that Syria has ratified. Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights entitles a suspect to “ade-

quate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defense,” and Article 19 guarantees
the right of freedom of expression. The
SSSC’s punishment of political prisoners
for their opinions without an opportunity
to defend themselves is a violation of this
Convention. The SSSC is also in violation
of Article 1 of the International Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
which prohibits using physical or mental pain to obtain a confession. Coercing
confessions is a common practice in the
pretrial period of the SSSC.
The SSSC was introduced in 1963 as an
exceptional court to prosecute critics of the
Government. Its charges against defendants
criminalize freedom of expression. Among
them are: “exposing Syria to the threat of
hostile acts;” “weakening nationalist sentiments;” and “opposing the objectives of
the revolution.” Defendants are subjected
to extensive pretrial detentions and torture, allowed minimal contact with lawyers, denied the right to appeal, and often
given pre-determined judgments. Torture
and restricting legal aid are violations of
Article 31 of The UN Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
The prison associated with the SSSC,
which houses bloggers, journalists,
Islamists, and activists, is notorious for
its poor conditions and use of torture. On
July 5, 2008, Syrian police opened fire on
rioting inmates, killing approximately 25
prisoners. There is no evidence as to what
happened to the prisoners in Sednaya that
day. The riot prompted the SSSC to halt its
operations temporarily.
Despite widespread international protests, the SSSC resumed its functions this
summer. Since then, arbitrary arrests of
political activists and journalists in Syria
have escalated. The rise in the number of
prosecutions against human rights defenders in Syria seems to indicate a larger effort
to repress Syrian civil society.

Egyptian Civil Society Organizations
Protest Egypt’s Legal Persecution
of Activists, Artists, and Academics
Egyptian activists, academics, lawyers,
and non-governmental organizations came
together on October 10, 2009 to denounce
a number of Hesba cases brought against
activists, artists, and academics in Egypt.
Hesba cases are lawsuits that can only be
filed by Muslims against individuals or
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organizations accusing them of insulting
God. The Arab Network for Human Rights
released a report earlier this month criticizing the quantity of Hesba cases that were
being brought in Egyptian courts. Supporters of the campaign against Hesba assert,
“An opinion should never drag anyone to
court.”
The arrest of Hassan Hanafi and Sayed
El Qemany were the final impetus for the
campaign. Hanafi and El Qemany are
Egyptian academics whose research on
reinterpretations of Islamic history and
critiques of political Islam incited protests
among conservative Islamists. Both were
accused of apostasy and are to be brought
in front of Egyptian courts in Hesba cases.
While Hesba cases are not unique to
Egypt, they are most prevalent there. This
fall, Egyptian courts have accepted more
Hesba cases than ever before. Although the
Prosecutor General has the right to limit
the number of Hesba cases that make it to
court, individuals continue to file hundreds
of complaints. The Prosecutor General has
legitimized these complaints by allowing
many of them to proceed to full-fledged
hearings.
Those who file Hesba cases often use
them to persecute individuals working in
academia, science, politics, art, and cinema. By permitting Hesba cases to come
into court, Egypt gives these complaints
a legal basis. Numerous writers, intellectuals, filmmakers, and activists have
been prosecuted in court. Among them are
famed Egyptian feminist, Nawal El Saadawi, who exiled herself to America after
repeated threats on her life, and Naguib
Sawiris, a businessman who criticized the
Egyptian Constitution for allowing Islamic
law to be a “major legislation resource.”
Punishments for those prosecuted in
Hesba courts go beyond fines and imprisonment, and include manipulating marriages, revoking citizenships, and physical
violence. Egyptian professor Nasr Hamid
Abu Zaid was forcibly divorced from his
wife for his controversial perspectives on
the Quran. The couple fled to the Netherlands after the ruling. In February 2009,
courts revoked the citizenships of Egyptians who were married to Israelis because
their marriages were claimed to be a threat
to national security and Islam. An Egyptian filmmaker, Enad El-Dighaidy, and an
unveiled Egyptian actress were threatened
with eighty lashes for “defaming the coun-
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try,” but the trial court decided in favor of
El-Dighaidy and the actress.
The Hesba cases violate Articles 15,
16, and 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. These articles reaffirm the right to protection from arbitrary
deprivation of nationality, state protection
of family and marriage, and freedom of
expression and opinion. Further, the Hesba
cases are in violation of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam adopted
by Member States of the Organization of
the Islamic Conference. Specifically, these
cases violate Article 5, the right to marriage, and Article 16, the right to enjoy
the fruits of scientific, literary, artistic, or
technical production. While these rights
can be subverted by violations of Shar’ia
Islamic law, Shar’ia stipulates that state
courts do not have the religious authority to
judge what are and what are not violations
of Islamic law.
A campaign initiated by the Arab Network for Human Rights and the Hisham
Mubarak Law Center is currently seeking
supporters to denounce efforts to limit
the freedom of expression and research
in Egypt. Through the campaign, these
organizations hope to deter the use of
legal mechanisms to persecute Egyptian
intellectuals and scholars. So far, six other
Arab human rights organizations and two
lawyers have joined the campaign. The
Egyptian government has yet to respond to
these organizations’ protests.

Europe
Lead-contaminated Roma Camps in
Kosovo
The Roma community’s decade-long
exposure to lead contamination in northern
Kosovo is one example of European reluctance to expose and rectify the persistent
human rights issues that Roma face.
During the 1999 bombing of Kosovo,
the Roma lived in Serb-majority areas in
the Mitrovica region of northern Kosovo.
Due to their linguistic ties, the Roma
were perceived as Serbian corroborators
and were targets of retaliatory Albanian
violence and eventually expulsion from
the region. One of these raids destroyed
the Roma Mahalla (“neighborhood” in
Turkish) in Mitrovica. As a result, a total
of 8,000 people were internally displaced.

While many fled to neighboring countries, others were temporarily relocated by
the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) to camps in the
Mitrovica region, where they live in makeshift tents, huts, and metal containers.
The World Health Organization (WHO)
advised the UNHCR against building these
camps because toxic lead waste in the area
made the land unsafe for human habitation.
The UNHCR did not heed these warnings,
and Roma families have lived in these
camps ever since.
Limited access to clean water and inadequate diet have compounded the problem
of lead contamination levels for the Roma
living in the camps. According to medical
studies conducted by Human Rights Watch,
lead exposure can damage internal organs
and the nervous system, stunt growth, and
lead to behavioral problems. It can also
negatively affect fetal brain development,
causing disabilities and mental retardation.
WHO-sponsored medical treatment for
poisoned Roma children was discontinued
in 2007 because, without relocation and
adequate diet, treatment would be futile.
Three main solutions were proposed
for the displaced Roma. The first was to
rebuild the Mahalla resettlement. Although
many international actors preferred this
option, it was rejected by the residents of
the camps because they would lose access
to Serbian welfare and health benefits.
Second and most popular among the camp
residents was resettlement north of the Ibar
River. There is, however, no land presently
available for such an undertaking. The third
is to relocate residents to other countries.
This idea seems unrealistic mainly because
Western European countries are reluctant
to take in Eastern European Roma. As
one European Commission official stated,
“There is no appetite in Europe for more
asylum seekers from that region.”
The Roma’s ongoing plight in Kosovo
results from the lack of one single institution to assume responsibility for negotiating and implementing urgent evacuation
and medical treatment for these individuals. The UNHCR initially managed the
camps, followed by United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), and then the Kosovo Agency for
Advocacy and Development since January 2009. Camp residents view this latest
change in management as a sign that the
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international community is washing its
hands of this burden.
Roma rights activists like Diane Post
continue their efforts to obtain justice. In
July 2008, Post helped an international
law firm file a complaint on behalf of the
Roma families with the UNMIK Human
Rights Advisory Panel for violations of the
right to life, protection against inhumane
and degrading treatment, and the right to
a fair trial. The case is currently pending.
The treatment of the displaced Roma is
an institutionalized crime. Ongoing lead
poisoning in Kosovo is especially appalling
because aid organizations are complicit.
Former Czech President and human rights
campaigner, Vaclav Havel, once said, “The
fate of the Roma would be a litmus test for
Europe’s new democracies.” Based on this
account of the Roma in Kosovo, it seems
that Europe has yet to meet Havel’s test.

Italy’s Immigration Policy Faces New
Criticism
Italy’s new public security law, passed
on August 8, 2009, is the latest in a series of
measures by the government to combat the
rise in illegal immigration. The law seeks
to deter illegal immigration by making it
a criminal offense punishable by fines of
€5,000 to €10,000, with prison terms of
up to four years for those who defy expulsion orders. The law also allows unarmed
civilians to work alongside enforcement
officers to report and apprehend undocumented individuals. Italian citizens who
help hide migrants or fail to report them
could face anti-solidarity charges. Earlier this year, the Senate enacted another
security bill authorizing medical staff to
report patients who are illegal immigrants
to Italian immigration officials. These new
policies deprive undocumented immigrants
of basic human rights including freedom
from persecution and access to health care.
In addition to new legislation, Italy’s
much criticized “push-back” policy cracks
down on the arrival of undocumented individuals by sea. In 2008, an estimated
36,000 migrants entered Italy by sea via
Lampedusa, an island off the coast of
Sicily. The majority comes from Africa
to escape persecution and violence. A
2008 agreement between Italy and Libya
increased patrols of international waters
to interdict migrants en route to Europe.
Migrants on the interdicted boats have
been either forced onto Libyan vessels or
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taken directly to Libya, where authorities
allegedly detain and mistreat them.
Migrants on boats intercepted by Libyan authorities are not screened to determine if any individuals are asylum seekers
or refugees before being forcibly returned
to Libya. Therefore, according to a Human
Rights Watch report, the agreement with
Libya is in violation of Italy’s obligation as
a State Party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the United Nations
Convention against Torture, and European
Convention on Human Rights not to force
the return of people to “countries where
their lives or freedom would be threatened,
or where they would face a risk of torture
or inhuman and degrading treatment.”
Migrants that manage to escape Libyan
vessels are often subsequently interdicted
by Italian officials and held in overcrowded
detention centers on Lampedusa. The conditions are so poor that more than half
of the detainees are forced to sleep outside under plastic sheeting. Although the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) provides assistance
to the migrants on the island under a project funded by the Italian Ministry of the
Interior and the European Commission,
overcrowding in these temporary detention centers has become a humanitarian
concern.
The Italian government justifies these
draconian measures as a national security
issue. Critics, however, attribute these laws
to the country’s failure to better facilitate
the integration of immigrants into Italian
society. The European Union is also at fault
for failing to implement a common immigration approach throughout the EU so that
individual countries would be barred from
adopting extreme immigration policies.
According to many human rights activists,
the EU needs to become more involved
in protecting immigrants and supporting
policies for greater integration of new
immigrants.

Kazakhstan: Human Rights Defender
Faces Unfair Trial
In 2010, Kazakhstan will chair the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), despite its worrisome human rights record. Among recent
offenses are abuses of due process in the
criminal justice system. On September
3, 2009, a Kazakh court found Evgeniy

Zhovtis guilty of manslaughter and sentenced him to four years in prison for
causing a car accident that killed a young
man. The sentence was upheld on appeal.
Zhovtis is the director of the Kazakhstan
Bureau on Human Rights and Rule of
Law and a leading human rights advocate
in Kazakhstan. He is a spokesperson for
various human rights issues in the country
including freedom of religion, freedom of
assembly, and electoral reform.
International observers at Zhovtis’s twoday court hearing included individuals
from the OSCE, the Norwegian Helsinki
Committee, Human Rights Watch, along
with leaders of Kazakhstan’s opposition
parties.
Zhovtis’s lawyer, Vitaliy Voronov, argued
on appeal that his client was deprived of
the due process right to a fair trial and an
opportunity to properly present a defense.
The trial was marked by violations of the
Kazakh rules of criminal procedure. First,
under Kazakh law, anyone suspected of
a crime must be informed immediately.
Zhovtis was informed after 17 days, giving
his lawyers little time to prepare his case.
Second, the trial judge either rejected or
postponed all defense petitions without ruling on them. For example, the court denied
the defense’s motions to introduce expert
technical evidence refuting the prosecution’s incomplete motor-vehicle examination, introduce three experts on road traffic
accidents, and exclude the prosecution’s
report, which used outdated forensic methods. Lastly, the court did not grant enough
time for the defense to prepare a final
statement before pronouncing the verdict.
Specifically, the defense requested a few
days to prepare a final statement, but the
judge only granted forty minutes. The
defense was also barred from admitting the
victim’s mother’s statement of forgiveness
that renounced all criminal charges against
Zhovtis. These actions resulted in a blatant
denial of Zhovtis’s opportunity to challenge the evidence brought against him.
In a statement made following the verdict, Zhovtis alluded to the possibility that
political motives may have contributed to
the denial of a fair hearing. “There is no
law here,” he stated. “[T]here is no justice
here. Where there is no law and no justice,
unfortunately there is a political setup.”
In addition to political machinations, his
defense counsel charged that the judge’s
final verdict was prepared in advance, as
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he could not have drafted a five-page judgment within thirty minutes of deliberation.
Although the Almaty Province Court
is the final court of appeal, Kazakh legislation allows for a supervisory hearing
to address possible procedural violations.
In light of Kazakhstan’s violations of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders, and other international
human rights instruments, Human Rights
Watch has urged Kazakh authorities to reopen the investigation and provide Zhovtis
a fair and impartial trial. OSCE members
should put pressure on Kazakhstan to
improve its human rights record as 2010
approaches.

South and Central Asia
Landmark Decision in India
Decriminalizing Sex between
Same-Sex Partners
The High Court of Delhi handed down
a landmark decision on July 2, 2009, igniting fierce debate throughout India. The
opinion in Naz Foundation v. Government
of NCT Delhi declared that Section 377
of the Indian Penal Code, criminalizing
private sexual acts between consenting,
same-sex adults violated the Indian Constitution. After a decade-long campaign,
the Naz Foundation (India) Trust (Naz
India) brought a public interest suit against
local and national government authorities, claiming that Section 377 violated
Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Indian
Constitution. Named defendants included
the National Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
In response, the Indian government set
up a group of ministers to decide the merits of Naz India’s challenge. The Union
Cabinet and the Ministers chose to let the
Supreme Court handle the matter, but sent
Attorney General Goolam Essaji Vahanvati
to assist in the formulation of an opinion.
In a move which gave hope to advocates
of the decision, the Indian government
chose not to challenge the decision in the
Supreme Court.
Many argue that decriminalization of
same-sex partnerships will tear away at the
social fabric of India and its deeply religious culture. NGOs and private citizens
oppose the ruling, including Swami Ramdev, a spiritual teacher, and the Delhi Commission for Protection of Child Rights.
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The Indian Supreme Court faces enormous
pressure from religious groups, including
Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Christian organizations, many of whom find themselves
on the same side of an issue for the first
time. The foremost university for Islamic
education in India, Darul Uloom Deoband, strongly opposes the ruling, as does
the government’s main opposition party,
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata
Party. The Indian Supreme Court also faces
international pressure to uphold the High
Court’s ruling. The United Nations Joint
Programme on HIV/AIDS heralded the
High Court decision as a noteworthy step
in the fight against HIV and AIDS.
Neither the Indian Supreme Court nor
the government agencies involved have
specified when final challenges will be
heard or when the final decision will be
handed down. Regardless of the outcome,
it is unlikely the Indian government will
dispute the decision.
According to the International Gay and
Lesbian Association’s 2009 Survey of State
Sponsored Homophobia, eighty countries
still criminalize sex between consenting
adults of the same sex. Twenty-two of
those eighty countries are in Asia and
the Middle East. In seven of them, samesex intercourse is punishable by death. In
many countries, “being gay” is considered
a Western lifestyle that would be unheard
of without European and American influence. If the Indian Supreme Court stands
by the Delhi High Court’s opinion, it will
serve as an example among of the potential to accept same-sex partnerships while
maintaining traditional values and cultural
identity.

Prisoner Releases in Turkmenistan:
Sign of Change or Singular Reform?
On September 29, 2009, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov of Turkmenistan released 1,670 prisoners, including
21 foreigners. This followed the release of
9,000 prisoners in October 2008 and 2,000
earlier this year. Those released include
political prisoners detained during the over
two-decade-long autocratic rule of former President Saparmurat Niyazov. Since
his election in February 2007, Berdymukhamedov has sought to encourage
foreign investment by softening the country’s image. The recent freeing of political
and other undisclosed prisoners signals a
change in policy and increased openness

in Turkmenistan since Niyazov’s death in
2006.
Thus far, Berdymukhamedov’s new
strategy has succeeded in generating interest in investment in the country, creating
an opportunity to influence reforms. Multinational companies interested in hydrocarbon fuel sources have frequently visited,
and both the United States and European
nations have shown interest in Turkmenistan’s rich natural-gas reserves. In July
2009, the European Union approved a trade
agreement with Turkmenistan. Although
initially delayed in the European Parliament because of human rights concerns,
the agreement was finally passed with the
hope of pushing Turkmenistan to change
its policies. Despite such efforts, Berdymukhamedov has failed to democratize
Turkmenistan, continuing to deny freedom
of expression, intimidate journalists, and
commit other abuses similar to those of his
predecessor’s administration.
Fifteen NGOs issued “A Call for Access
to Turkmenistan” on September 29, 2009,
requesting that the strengthening of diplomatic and business relationships be accompanied by a push for human rights. The
statement encouraged businesses, countries, and international organizations to use
their newly-founded contacts with Turkmenistan to push for access to the country
and information therein.
Although Berdymukhamedov has
moved to get rid of some of Niyazov’s most
appalling policies, remnants of Niyazov’s
autocracy are still visible in Turkmenistan: state-controlled media; policies forcing foreign journalists to work in secret;
and restrictions on fundamental freedoms.
Despite the number of prisoners who have
been released, many are still detained. Reliable estimates of the numbers of political
prisoners are unavailable because of a
lack of access. The reports available from
Turkmen prisons allege torture, sentencing
without fair trial, and appalling conditions. Human rights organizations have
continually been denied access to examine possible human rights violations since
Berdymukhamedov took power. Another
issue is the black-lists used to stop Turkmen citizens from leaving the country. In
early October 2009, the government denied
students permission to study at the American University in Bulgaria. Previously,
these same students were also stopped
from studying at the American University
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of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan and only
found out they were “black-listed” when a
border guard informed them. According to
Human Rights Watch, hundreds of students
have been prevented from studying abroad
since July 2009.
Turkmenistan is a State Party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, guaranteeing freedom of movement, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
guaranteeing the rights to education and
access to higher education. The building blocks of reform are in place, and
the opening of Turkmenistan presents an
opportunity to push for reform. It remains
to be seen whether the opportunity will be
wasted in the race for natural gas reserves,
or whether the release of these prisoners
will signal the beginning of human rights
reform.

Bagram Prison Reform: Championing
Rights or Military Maneuvers?
Although it does not share the same
notorious reputation as the military
prison at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility
in Afghanistan has come under increasing
scrutiny. Since September 2006, twenty
detainees have been moved from Guantanamo to Bagram, which has become well
known for sleep deprivation and waterboarding. A prison-wide protest has been
taking place since July 1, 2009 in objection
to a lack of rights, including denial of legal
counsel and information regarding the reasons for their imprisonment.
Pressure on the U.S. government about
the Bagram facility began in April 2009,
when U.S. District Judge John D. Bates
held in Al Maqaleh v. Gates that Bagram
detainees had equivalent legal rights to
those detained in Guantanamo. The decision gave three Bagram detainees the right
to seek review of habeas corpus petitions
for release. Amnesty International reports
that the Obama Administration filed a brief
in September in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Al Maqaleh
case, arguing that Bagram detainees should
be denied the right to challenge their detention and attaching new “Detainee Review
Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment
Facility” set to go into effect in September
2009.
These rules provide for the review of
the detention of over six hundred prisoners
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in the Bagram facility suspected of AlQaeda and Taliban involvement and will
closely resemble the Guantanamo Administrative Review Board process. U.S.
military officials will represent detainees
before military review boards during which
detainees may call witnesses and present
evidence. The review boards will decide if
the detainee will remain in U.S. custody,
be transferred to Afghan custody, or be
released.
U.S. officials claim this process is a
marked improvement over Guantanamo’s.
Because most of the detainees are Afghani
and most of the crimes took place in
Afghanistan, witnesses and evidence are
easier to procure. However, a major issue
with the system is that detainees will not be
protected by attorney-client confidentiality.
Despite its faults, the review board will be
the first opportunity for Bagram detainees
to officially challenge their imprisonment.
As of October 2009, U.S. military officers
and officials had already been assigned to
review boards and to individual detainees.
Officials also plan to let isolated detainees
see relatives and to begin releasing those
detained without charge. In November, a
new facility will replace the dilapidated
Bagram prison, hopefully providing more
humane conditions.
These steps, however, are not motivated
solely by humanitarian concerns. Rather,
they come after a strategic assessment of
the war ordered by General Stanley A.
McChrystal, which concluded that prison
facilities in Afghanistan created “breeding
grounds” for Al-Qaeda recruits by mixing
militants with small-time criminals. Additionally, in mid-October, Taliban leaders
showed a willingness to negotiate with
the U.S. government, offering a possible
severing of ties with Al Qaeda. One of the
items up for negotiation is a program for
the release of Bagram prisoners. In return,
Taliban leaders made an ambiguous offer
to ensure Afghanistan would not be used to
attack the United States.
However, since the CIA will lose longterm detention facilities with the closure
of Guantanamo, many U.S. officials are
fighting to keep Bagram open. The United
States has ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,
which bans detention without cause and
the denial of due process, and it is also a
signatory of the Third Geneva Convention,
which addresses the treatment of prisoners

of war. The United States has been accused
of violating both of these international conventions at Guantanamo and risks the same
accusations at Bagram.

East Asia
Labor Issues at the Kaesǒng
Industrial Complex in North Korea
Located just across the demilitarized
zone in North Korea, the Kaesǒng Industrial Complex (KIC) is an industrial area
where South Korean companies use North
and South Korean labor to manufacture
products. A joint project formed in 2004
between North and South Korea, the
KIC is a symbol of the growing level of
engagement in North-South relations. As
of June 2009, about forty thousand North
Koreans and one thousand South Koreans were employed in the KIC, producing watches, shoes, clothes, kitchenware,
plastic containers, electrical cords, and car
parts. Recently, however, concerns have
been raised about working conditions and
exploitation at the KIC.

KIC workers and selects worker representatives. By not allowing companies to bid
for skilled workers, the North Korean government maintains a stable workforce and
controls labor costs. This practice interferes with the workers’ ability to elect their
own representatives to act on their behalf.
Moreover, it is a clear violation of workers’
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, which are protected by
international treaties to which North and
South Korea are States Parties, including
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
and the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.
To fulfill its legal obligations to workers within its borders, the North Korean
government should work with the International Labor Organization to re-examine and revise the KIC Labor Law. The
law should be amended to include workers’ rights to freedom of association; to
choose their employment according to their
wishes free from government interference;
and to be fully informed of their rights.
Furthermore, South Korean corporations
should perform their duties as employers
to respect labor standards and to enforce
the KIC Labor Law effectively. The revised
law should impose sanctions on employers
in cases where violations occur. The continued success of economic collaboration
between North and South Korea depends
on adequate and effective legal protections
of workers in the KIC.

Officially, the minimum monthly wage
for North Korean workers at the KIC is
U.S. $52.50. However, North Korean government authorities retain the majority of
worker salaries, and only a small amount
reaches employees’ pockets. Article 32 of
the KIC Labor Law requires that South
Korean companies disburse wages directly
to workers in cash. In practice, these funds
are paid to a government agency in U.S.
dollars at the request of the North Korean
government, which maintains that this policy is due to insufficient foreign exchange
centers in the KIC. Human Rights Watch
suggests that as much as thirty percent
of wages owed to workers at the KIC
are retained as contributions to a fund
to provide free housing, healthcare, and
education to the North Korean public.
Others go further to argue that the workers in the KIC receive only about U.S. $2
per month, which means the North Korean
government absorbs about 96.7 percent of
the wages. Although the KIC Labor Law
guarantees employees full compensation
for their labor, the exact amount workers
receive remains unclear.

Imprisonment of China’s Legal
Activists

In addition, other fundamental workers’
rights are not covered by the KIC Labor
Law. The North Korean Central Guidance
Agency on Special Zone Development, a
cabinet level administrative body, recruits

Among the advocates targeted were Xu
Zhiyong, founder of the Open Constitution
Initiative (OCI), and Zhuang Lu, OCI’s
financial manager. Known as Gongmeng
in Chinese, OCI was founded in 2002
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On October 1, 2009, China celebrated
the 60th anniversary of its Communist
leadership. Displaying pride in their country’s development, government officials
and citizens organized parades, firework
displays, and events to contribute to the
biggest celebration in Chinese history.
However, in addition to the festivities, the
event included efforts to silence dissenting
voices to prevent them from raising human
rights concerns challenging the image of
social harmony.

Wilson et al.: International Legal Updates
to provide representation for victims in
cases that are unwelcomed by the Chinese
government. The lawyers at OCI are at the
forefront of providing free legal services to
disadvantaged groups in China, including
victims of torture and parents of children
who died or fell ill after drinking tainted
milk.
On July 14, 2009, OCI received notification from the national and Beijing tax
bureaus of a fine for ¥1.42 million (U.S.
$208,000). Shortly thereafter, Xu Zhiyong
and Zhuang Lu were seized on suspicion of
tax evasion. Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau
officials confiscated files, computers, and
other equipment from OCI’s office and
ordered the center shut down.
Officially, Xu Zhiyong was charged
with tax evasion. The Chinese government
claimed OCI was shut down because it was
operating as a business and had not registered as a non-profit as required by law.
However, civil rights activists and human
rights organizations allege that it was part
of a larger effort to stifle dissent in the
countdown to the celebration by targeting
civil rights advocates. This discrepancy in
registration is likely due to highly restrictive government regulations. Xu Zhiyong
claimed that although OCI had not registered as an NGO, it “has always been
a non-profit organization” and that OCI
made “no profits whatsoever, but . . .
got penalties for income tax.” Since only
organizations with government approval
prior to their formation can register as nonprofits, many take the same route as OCI,
registering initially as commercial entities
and later trying to register as NGOs. Thus,
the forcible shutdown of OCI has alarmed
China’s non-profit community.
The arrests of Xu Zhiyong and Zhuang
Lu illustrate only a fraction of what civil
rights activists experience in China. Lawyers who take politically sensitive cases
face possible arrest, kidnapping, and physical attacks. Amnesty International, which
continues to receive reports of intimidation of activists in Beijing, estimates that
several hundred dissidents are under various kinds of surveillance or house arrest
throughout China.
Zhuang Lu and Xu Zhiyong were
released on August 22 and 23, respectively,
perhaps largely due to public advocacy in
China and Hong Kong. Although this may
demonstrate increasing responsiveness to
domestic activism, NGOs in China con-

tinue to face government restrictions and
interference.
In a statement on his blog, Xu Zhiyoung describes OCI’s closure as a “penalty to the baby victims of the poisonous
milk powders; a penalty to the young
students at migrant workers’ childrens’
schools . . . [and] a penalty to tens of thousands of the poor and powerless, those who
need the society’s help the most.” By sanctioning lawyers for their efforts to remedy
social tensions, the Chinese government is
preventing its citizens from seeking legal
redress for their grievances, leaving innocent individuals with no remedy for their
injuries.

Criminal Procedures in Japan: The
Need for Reform
After serving 17 years in prison, Toshikazu Sugaya was released in June this year
when DNA testing failed to connect him
with the crime. Sugaya was sentenced to
life in prison in 1993 for murdering a fouryear-old girl after confessing to the crime
during a police interrogation. He later
retracted his confession, arguing it was
obtained through duress. At his retrial that
began on October 21, 2009, Sugaya pled
not guilty and asked the court to justify his
treatment.
Sugaya’s wrongful conviction sparked
calls for reform of Japan’s criminal justice
system, which has long been the subject of
criticism by international community for
lack of mechanisms to protect defendants’
rights. In Japan, suspects are detained in
daiyo kangoku — holding cells in police
stations — for as long as 23 days without
charges. Suspects are questioned without
legal representation and without a time
limit on interrogation sessions.
The conviction rate in Japan is over 99
percent, partially due to the large number
of confessions obtained at daiyo kangoku.
Relying on confessions as the basis of
conviction encourages the use of force
or threat during interrogations. Amnesty
International contends that coercion,
assault, and other inhumane treatment,
including keeping suspects awake for days,
are used in daiyo kangoku. Thus, many
suspects confess to crimes they did not
commit to protect themselves from further
abuse.
The United Nations Committee against
Torture was established under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Japan acceded in 1999.
In 2007, the 38th session of the Committee examined Japan’s criminal justice
system, and specifically addressed the use
of torture in daiyo kangoku, stating that the
lack of procedural guarantees for detainees
“may lead to a de facto failure to respect
the principles of presumption of innocence,
right to silence and right of defense.”
The Committee recommended that Japan
implement measures to guarantee that all
detainees have legal representation and
that independent monitoring of police conduct is carried out. The Committee also
expressed concern with Japan’s high conviction rate and called for systematic monitoring and recording of interrogations.
However, Japan responded that the presence of defense counsel during interrogations would hinder investigations and
inhibit effective questioning. Japanese
police and public prosecutors also argue
that recording interrogation sessions will
decrease the level of trust between suspects
and investigators, impeding the efficiency
of the questioning process.
In Japan’s August 2009 general election,
the Democratic Party of Japan overwhelmingly defeated the Liberal Democratic
Party, which had governed for 54 years,
and promised to adopt monitoring mechanisms for interrogations at daiyo kangoku.
With due consideration of human rights,
the new Japanese government should keep
its pledge to guarantee suspects’ rights and
avoid wrongful convictions. Only through
judicial procedures conforming to international standards can the Japanese criminal
system fulfill its function to deter and punish perpetrators and to effectively protect
Japanese society and its citizens.

Southeast Asia and Oceania
Thai Government to Forcibly
Repatriate Lao Hmong Refugees
The government of Thailand announced
that it will forcibly repatriate all remaining
Lao Hmong refugees from Thailand by the
end of 2009. These repatriations are pursuant to a joint Lao-Thai Committee on Border Security agreement requiring Thailand
to return all Hmong to Laos. Currently,
approximately 4,000 refugees still live in
the military-controlled Huai Nam Khao
camp. While the Thai government claims
that most repatriations are voluntary, they
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come without independent observation and
are often the result of extreme coercion by
the military.
Conditions in the Huai Nam Khao camp
are stark, and the Thai government severely
limits access by outsiders. Médecins Sans
Frontièrs (MSF) was the only organization
allowed inside the camp, but according
to MSF, “restrictions and coercive tactics
imposed by the Thai military authorities”
forced the organization to cease operations.
Despite repeated requests, the Thai government has refused access to the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees.
The Huai Nam Khao camp is crowded
and unsanitary. There is a high risk of diarrhea and cholera epidemics and, according
to MSF, a “high level of psychological
distress” among refugees. These mental
health issues are caused in part by a fear of
returning to Laos. Many Hmong, who were
trained by and fought with the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency during the Vietnam
War, are now targeted and persecuted by
the communist Lao government. In the
past, refugees in the Huai Nam Khao camp
have resorted to arson, hunger strikes, and
suicide attempts in an effort to stop their
repatriation and garner attention from the
outside world.
Thai officials claim that the Lao Hmong
are economic migrants and not refugees
protected by international law. These claims
are contradicted, however, by reports that
Lao government officials indefinitely
detain and abuse some repatriated Hmong.
To avoid capture, many Hmong live in the
jungle in Laos, hiding from the government and the military. One young Hmong
refugee in Thailand described her experience to MSF: “Laotian soldiers attack
us regularly, at least four or five times a
year . . . . Generally, the soldiers systematically kill the men and capture the women.”
In recent months the Lao military has
stepped up its assault on Hmong, reportedly with support from the Vietnamese
People’s Army. The Lao military has even
employed Hmong to hunt down their own
people. Several reports have circulated
describing heavy artillery attacks, including the use of mortars and machine guns,
on Hmong hiding in the highlands of Laos.
Thailand’s treatment of refugees violates norms of international humanitarian
law. Thailand is not a signatory to the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of

Refugees and has no domestic refugee law
or provisions for asylum. Even though the
Thai government is not violating domestic
law in repatriating these refugees, forcing
refugees to return to their country of origin
violates the customary international law
principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement protects people from being forcibly
returned to a country where their lives or
freedom would be threatened.
Many international humanitarian organizations, governments, and the UN have
called for Thailand to improve its treatment
of refugees and to stop the planned repatriation. Eric Schwartz, Assistant Secretary
for the Bureau of Population, Refugees
and Migration at the U.S. State Department, told the Human Rights Brief that
it is the State Department’s position that
“anyone returned [to Laos] has to have had
the opportunity to have their claims heard
in a fair and transparent manner.” Despite
this foreign pressure, the Thai government insists on going forward with the
repatriations.

Tongan Parliament Rejects CEDAW
Ratification, Women’s Groups React
On September 18, 2009, the Tongan
Parliament announced that it will not ratify
the UN Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW). The Parliament reasoned that certain provisions of CEDAW
go against Tongan social and cultural tradition, and that women are “cherished
and respected” in Tonga without the Convention. Tongan officials also expressed
an unwillingness to change national laws
regarding land and inheritance rights, abortion, and family planning, which would be
mandated if the country adopted CEDAW.
In his speech to the UN General Assembly
on September 26, Dr. Feleti Sevele, Tonga’s
Prime Minister, emphasized that “Tonga
would rather be judged on its actions of
empowerment of women in Tongan society
over the past century than by a ratification
of convenience.” Currently, 185 states are
party to the Convention, representing over
90 percent of UN Member States. States
not party to CEDAW include Iran, Somalia, and Sudan.
The widest gap between existing Tongan law and the provisions of CEDAW
relates to land and inheritance. CEDAW
mandates that women have the same rights
as men to ownership of property and
choice of residence. In Tonga, however,
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women can lease but cannot own land.
Inheritance passes through male heirs, and
a son born out of wedlock takes precedence
over a widow or legitimate daughter in the
distribution of a man’s estate. A widow
may continue to live on her husband’s
land if there are no male heirs, so long as
she does not remarry or have any sexual
relationships.
Women’s groups in Tonga are reacting strongly to Parliament’s decision. In
response to the government’s claim that
women are “cherished,” ‘Ofakilevuka Guttenbeil, Managing Director of the Tongan
National Centre for Women and Children
(TNCWC), asked, “If this statement was
true why on earth are we seeing battered women on a daily basis . . . why on
earth have we had four homicides out of
six homicides in the first six months of
this year [concerning] husbands murdering their wives?” The TNCWC claims that
over two hundred women each year seek
help for domestic violence, while much
more goes unreported. This number is significant given Tonga’s relatively small population of approximately 50,220 women.
While the Parliament has declared its
intention to deal with women’s issues on
its own, many Tongan women’s groups
are still pressing for Tonga to align itself
with international standards by ratifying
CEDAW. A coalition of five women’s organizations is circulating a petition that they
will present to top government officials
in hopes of overturning the Parliament’s
decision. Some women activists have even
declared their intention to fast until Prime
Minister Sevele is removed from office.

Toward a Regional Understanding:
Challenges for ASEAN’s
Intergovernmental Commission on
Human Rights
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) officially
launched the new ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
(AICHR) on October 23, 2009. The AICHR
is a consultative body, comprised of one
government-appointed representative from
each of the ten ASEAN Member States.
Unlike other regional human rights bodies,
AICHR currently performs no investigative
or judicial functions. Although this body
has already faced considerable criticism,
little attention has been paid to the ways in
which the AICHR could be effective in the
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short term, including the kind of progress
that would be practical at this point.
Article 4.2 of the Terms of Reference,
the official governing document of the
AICHR, lists as one of its mandates and
primary functions “[t]o develop an ASEAN
Human Rights Declaration with a view to
establishing a framework for human rights
cooperation . . . .” Before the AICHR can
develop a substantive framework, however,
ASEAN Member States must first agree on
what “human rights” are, what standards
they will use to measure progress, and
what, if any, the consequences would be for
non-compliance.
Currently, there is a significant split
among ASEAN Member States in their
recognition of international human rights
norms as expressed through the ratification of international conventions and treaties. Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia have signed
and ratified almost all major international
human rights conventions. By contrast,
Malaysia, Burma, Singapore, and Brunei
have each ratified only the Convention for
the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC).
Given this sharp divide, a realistic starting point for the AICHR in drafting a
Human Rights Declaration might be rights
similar to those expressed in CEDAW
and CRC, since every ASEAN Member
State has generally accepted the principles
embodied in these conventions. Agreement
on issues such as gender equality and the

rights of children may help to create a
foundation for a broader Human Rights
Declaration. Moreover, the process of discussing and drafting an agreement on these
issues may facilitate improved cooperation
among Member States, easing the transition to debating more contentious issues.
Achieving the stated purposes of
AICHR, including the promotion and protection of human rights in the region, will
inevitably be slow. The region’s history of
human rights abuses and firm commitment
to national sovereignty create significant
hurdles that must first be cleared. At least
some ASEAN Member States, nevertheless, seem open to genuine dialogue and
compromise. The Philippines, for example,
has been pushing for the creation of the
AICHR for several years. Additionally,
Indonesia appointed as its representative
Rafendi Djamin, a veteran human rights
activist.
Despite early criticism, many human
rights advocates in the region are reserving
judgment until they see what the AICHR
can accomplish. Anna Samson, National
Legal, Communications, and Advocacy
Officer for the Jesuit Refugee Service in
Thailand, told the Human Rights Brief
that the formation of the AICHR is a “step
forward as it creates an avenue for dialogue
in the region.” Even so, Samson and other
members of civil society throughout the
region are cautiously waiting to see how
the AICHR can “operationalize human
HRB
rights” in Southeast Asia.
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